Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF STATECRAFT
Statecraft is the "doing" of strategy, the matching of ends and means. 1 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant disappearance of bi-polarity in international security affairs, U.S. policy makers have struggled to find a new framework to guide them to a better understanding of the nature of today's international relations.
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The objective of this quest has been to determine how U.S. leadership and strength fits in the post-Cold War world.
If a nation's statecraft is to be successful, implementation must be based on accurate assumptions about world interaction and the essence of politics. Providing structure to the debate over such underlying assumptions have been the concepts of 
THE TOOLS OF STATECRAFT
Before any detailed discussion of American investment strategies in the tools of statecraft can begin, the tools themselves must be identified. However, this discussion would be premature without first identifying the overall coordinating instrument of statecraft, diplomacy. 7 Diplomacy essentially is the attempt to "orchestrate" all the instruments of statecraft to serve national objectives. The lack of investment in international affairs has also begun to affect the ability of the U.S. to influence events and to practice preventive diplomacy, according to Binnendijk. Funds are insufficient to permit travel of foreign service officers outside capital cities, and with the cuts to embassy staffs, Binnendijk warns that the U.S. runs the risk of developing diplomatic Alzheimer's disease from lack of presence in the host country.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The focus of investments on defense-related, or hard power, tools supports the contention that the U.S. continues to rely on a strategy oriented on power rather than ideas. Whether as a result of successful containment, a successful grand strategy of preponderance, or an unintentional turn of events, it is undeniable that America today is a hegemonic power. 19 The relative stability in the post-Cold War environment is tied to how the U.S. has conducted international affairs since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
As defense spending has fallen by about 40 percent. 23 However, because of its worldwide responsibilities, America continues to spend five times more on defense than Russia, six times more than Japan and Germany, and possibly as much as eight times more than China.
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Taking into account this disparity between the costs of global and regional security obligations, the U.S. continues to focus five times the assets on defensive operations and maintenance than on international affairs. By maintaining its current paucity of funding for international affairs, the likelihood increases that foreign fear of U.S. dominance will drive the emergence of serious contenders to U.S.
hegemony.
Regardless, "hegemony has never been a winning strategy in modern international politics." 25 With this eventuality in mind, U.S. investment in the tools of statecraft must be balanced to meet the demands of the Twenty-first Century. Rather than avoiding a multipolar world, the U.S. should invest in both the hard and soft power tools to ensure U.S. influence in such a world. 27 In the case of hard-power tools, U.S. investments in defense must be increased in order to repair the damage inflicted on equipment and personnel as a result of the high operational tempo of the late-1990s. However, as John Hillen argues in the JulyAugust issue of Foreign Affairs, the allocation priorities of these increased investments need to be changed. Instead of investing in heavy tanks and stealthier, faster, more precise aircraft, the military needs to invest in the technologies that will meet the new threats of intrastate conflict, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.
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A CALL TO DIPLOMATIC RECOMMITMENT
From a budgetary aspect, it is undeniable that the U. S. has been using a Realist-oriented philosophy of statecraft since the conclusion of World War II. With investment in hard power tools at a rate three to eight times that of the other leading powers in the world, America has sought to ensure its hegemony in the post-Cold War environment. Washington, however, has been severely under-investing in international affairs for decades. As a result, American power is increasingly being seen as a threat to the national sovereignty and prosperity of even friends and allies. This fear undermines the trust of our friends and strengthens the resolve of our enemies.
The American debate over philosophies of statecraft, ongoing since Hamilton and Jefferson, will continue. However, the critical question is whether the current imbalance between investments in defense and international affairs will continue as well. Balanced handling of all of the tools of statecraft will provide the U.S. the best chance to maintain its influence in the international environment of the Twenty-first Century. If America chooses to not heed the warnings history provides to countries instituting hegemonic policies, then the U.S. risks repeating the mistakes of former hegemonies... 1940 1943 1946 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 Defense Int'l Affairs 
